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Abstract Perhaps the most striking phenomenon of visual
awareness is inattentional blindness (IB), in which a surpris-
ingly salient event right in front of you may go completely
unseen when unattended. Does IB reflect a failure of percep-
tion, or only of subsequent memory? Previous work has been
unable to answer this question, due to a seemingly intractable
dilemma: ruling out memory requires immediate perceptual
reports, but soliciting such reports fuels an expectation that
eliminates IB. Here we introduce a way of evoking repeated
IB in the same subjects and the same session: we show that
observers fail to report seeing salient events’ not only when
they have no expectation, but also when they have the wrong
expectations about the events nature. This occurs when ob-
servers must immediately report seeing anything unexpected,
even mid-event. Repeated IB thus demonstrates that IB is
aptly named: it reflects a genuine deficit in moment-by-
moment conscious perception, rather than a form of
inattentional amnesia.
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Introduction
Inattentional blindness (IB)— the failure to consciously per-
ceive otherwise salient events when they are not attended
(Mack & Rock, 1998; Most et al., 2005; Neisser & Becklen,
1975)— is one of psychology’s biggest exports. The failure to
perceive a gorilla walking through a scene, for example, has
become entrenched in popular culture (Chabris & Simons,
2010), and its initial demonstration has been cited over a
thousand times (Simons & Chabris, 1999). At least three
factors may contribute to this impact: First, the magnitude of
IB is often extreme: what we fail to perceive is not a subtle
detail of an event, or a change from one feature to another, but
rather the entire event itself, no matter how salient (e.g., a
bright red cross moving through a field of black and white
shapes; Most et al., 2001). Second, it is deeply counterintui-
tive: almost everyone is surprised that failures of awareness of
this magnitude are even possible. And third, IB has dramatic
real-world consequences (e.g., causing traffic accidents, or
errors in medical diagnosis; e.g., Drew et al., 2013).
Blindness or amnesia?
What is the underlying cause of IB? There are at least two
possibilities. One is that IB may reflect a failure of perception:
we may fail to report seeing a gorilla because we never saw it
in the first place. Alternatively, since such reports are solicited
after the fact, IB may reflect a failure of memory: we may be
phenomenally aware of ‘missed’ events, but inattention may
nevertheless prevent encoding into memory — yielding not
‘blindness,’ but rather a form of ‘inattentional amnesia’ (e.g.,
Wolfe, 1999) or ‘inattentional inaccessibility’ (e.g., Block,
2011). Critically, note that intuition cannot settle this question.
It certainly seems odd to think that we could see a gorilla but
later be unable to report it, but of course such a phenomenon
would by definition not be noticeable, and so could not
influence our intuitions.
Though this issue seems foundational, previous work has
been unable to resolve it, due to a seemingly intractable
dilemma. If observers are asked about their perception of
unexpected events after the fact, then it may simply be too
late; perhaps they saw the events, but the resulting iconic
traces have disappeared (cf., Sperling, 1960), with no
encoding intomore durable forms ofmemory. But if observers
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are given proactive instructions to report unexpected events,
then they attend to those events (having now been looking for
them), and so IB is attenuated or eliminated. This has struck
several theorists as an unsolvable problem— e.g., that “there
are serious problems with any experimental effort to directly
ask subjects if something is consciously perceived without
attention”, and that this “proves to be impossible because the
demand to report on [an unexpected event] directs attention to
[it]” (Wolfe, 1999).
Here we introduce a way to escape this dilemma,
reporting two experiments that evoke repeated IB in the
same observers, in the same session — where the unex-
pected event not only occurs multiple times (e.g., as in
Mack & Clarke, 2012), but where IB occurs even when
observers are asked about what they noticed after each
instance. In particular, we show that IB occurs not only
when observers have no expectation for the relevant
events, but also when they have the wrong expectations
about the relevant events’ nature. Moreover, this occurs
when observers must immediately report seeing anything
unexpected, even mid-event.
Experiment 1: Repeated Inattentional Blindness
We employed a sustained inattentional blindness task
(Most et al., 2001, 2005): observers viewed moving
black and white L and T shapes, counting the number
of times that a subset crossed the display’s midline. On
the fourth trial, an unexpected gray cross (the Unex-
pected Event; UE) appeared and traversed the entire
display, and observers subsequently reported whether
they had noticed it. After this event, observers were
explicitly told to watch for subsequent UEs — and
during some later trials, the gray cross appeared again.
We theorized that this would induce expectation that
was specific to the gray cross. The critical trial then
occurred after three presentations of the gray cross
(interspersed with additional no-UE trials), when a new
‘unexpected’ object traversed the display: a black ‘E’
shape. (These events are depicted in Fig. 1, though
using the colors and numbers of shapes from Experi-
ment 2.) We assessed observers’ awareness of this sec-
ond UE immediately after its offset.
Method
Participants
Observers were recruited and run online via AmazonMechan-
ical-Turk. (For discussion of this pool’s reliability, see Crump
et al., 2013.) Data collection continued until we had recruited
100 observers who failed to notice the first unexpected event
(UE1), per the exclusion criteria discussed below (see
Table 1).1
Apparatus
After agreeing to participate, observers were redirected to a
web server where platform-independent stimulus presentation
and data collection were completed by custom software run in
observers’web browsers, written using a combination of PHP
and jQuery.
Stimuli and procedure
Because the display loaded within observers’ own web
browsers, viewing distance and screen resolutions could vary
dramatically, and so we report critical dimensions using abso-
lute pixel (px) values. All events took place within a gray
window (610 px ×500 px), horizontally bisected by a purple
(1 px) line, and with a small (10 px) fixation square at its
center. After 1 s, four black and four white L and T shapes (65
px block letters) appeared and moved independently for 14 s
along linear paths at velocities randomly ranging from 144 to
229 px/s. During their motion, the shapes could occlude each
other and reflect off the edges of the display, and passed under
the midline. Observers were instructed to fixate the central
point and to count how many times the white shapes crossed
the midline. Following each trial, observers were prompted for
their tally.
The initial trial sequence was typical for IB studies (e.g.,
Mack & Rock, 1998; Most et al., 2001), and began with three
trials containing only the L and Tshapes. Five seconds into the
fourth trial, a gray cross (65 px; 37 % luminance) unexpect-
edly entered the display on the right, moved horizontally
along the midline, passed behind the fixation point, and even-
tually exited the display on the left, after having been visible
for 5 s.
After the motion ended, the display disappeared, and ob-
servers were asked whether they noticed “anything … that
was different from the first three trials” — and if so, to
describe what was different. They were then shown the gray
cross and asked if they had noticed it— and if so, to describe
where it was and how it moved. Only observers who explicitly
reported not noticing the cross were counted as ‘nonnoticers’
to be included in the final sample (N = 100).
1 Most previous IB experiments have used roughly 20 subjects per
condition, but we arbitrarily decided before collection began to quintuple
this number. We chose this relatively large sample not because it was
necessary for our effects, but simply because online data collection allows
for vastly larger samples to be readily collected. This is to our knowledge
the first report of IB with online data collection.
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Observers then completed six more trials. Trials five, sev-
en, and eight contained noUE; trials six (UE2) and nine (UE3)
contained the gray cross again, as ‘divided attention’ trials
(e.g., Most et al., 2001) — and after each of these trials (i.e.,
every trial after UE1), observers were asked the same series of
questions that had followed UE1. On the tenth and last trial
(UE4), a black E shape (65 px) unexpectedly entered the
display on the left after 5 s, moved horizontally along the
midline, passed behind the fixation point, and eventually
exited the display on the right, after having been visible for
5 s. Immediately after UE4 disappeared, the display disap-
peared, and observers were again asked the same series of
questions (though now probing about the black E rather than
the gray cross). Observers who explicitly reported not noticing
the black E were counted as ‘repeated nonnoticers.’
After the 10th trial ended, observers answered follow-up
questions about their performance on the midline-crossings
task, their attention to instructions, their expectations about
unexpected events, what they were looking for, and whether
they had heard of similar experiments (e.g., with a missed
gorilla). We excluded from analyses observers who left ques-
tions unanswered or failed to answer an instruction check, and
those who reported expecting an unexpected event. These
exclusions were computed during the data collection phase,
so that the experiment resulted in exactly 100 nonnoticers after
these exclusions (see Table 1 for details).
UE4 differed from the previous UEs not only in its use of a
different shape andmotion direction, but also in that it came later
in the session. To control for this, we also included a between-









Fig. 1 (a) A sample screenshot of a sustained inattentional blindness
display from Experiment 2 wherein the unexpected event is a dark blue
cross traversing the display from right to left. (b) A sample screenshot of a
sustained inattentional blindness display from Experiment 2 wherein the
unexpected event is a dark red ‘E’ shape traversing the display from left to
right. In Experiment 2, one of these shape/motion combinations
(counterbalanced across observers, with color also counterbalanced)
was used for UE1, UE2, and UE3, while the other shape/motion combi-
nation was used for UE4. In Experiment 1, UE1, and UE2, and UE3 were
always gray crosses, and UE4 was a black E
Table 1 Incidence of repeated inattentional blindness. The number of
observers recruited and included in the final samples for Experiments 1
and 2, along with the resulting degrees of inattentional blindness for the
initial UE (UE1) and the critical UE (UE4) are presented. In both
experiments, data collection continued until exactly 100 non-excluded
observers who missed UE1
Critical Unexpected Event Type Expt. 1 – Repeated IB Expt. 2 – Immediate Report
Black E Gray Cross (Control) Novel Event Repeated Event (Control)
Total Recruited 239 302 468 565
Total Excluded 42 67 135 168
Colorblind - - 46 42
Expecting unexpected 40 59 74 97
Poor/lack of response 2 8 15 29
Total Included 197 235 333 397
# who missed UE1 100 (50.76 %) 100 (42.55 %) 100 (30.03 %) 100 (25.19 %)
# who missed UE4 29 (29.00 %) 16 (16.00 %) 13 (13.00 %) 4 (4.00 %)
The bold text is to differentiate the key data from the exclusion criteria
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consisted of the gray cross appearing for its fourth time. This
allowed us to directly compare the number of observers
who failed to notice the novel type of UE4 with the
repeated type of UE4 — and so ensure that any differ-
ences could not simply reflect its serial position within the
trial sequence.
Results
Error rates for the overt midline-crossings task (i.e., the dif-
ference between their tally and actual number, divided by the
actual number) were not significantly different for observers
who noticed (22.67 %) or failed to notice (18.75 %) the UE1
(t(195) = 1.52, p = 0.13, d = 0.22).
As shown in Table 1, approximately half of observers
failed to notice UE1 (100/197 = 50.76 %), replicating the
phenomenon of IB. (Note that IB rate varies as a function of
many factors, such as the visual similarity of the UE to the
task-relevant items; e.g., Most, et al. 2001.)
Critically, of these 100 nonnoticers, 29 subsequently missed
the final unexpected event when it had unexpected features (i.e.,
the black rightward-moving E), even when they were asked to
report their experience immediately after its offset (during which
time a report could still be based on the visual ‘icon,’ had one
formed; see Wolfe, 1999). To our knowledge, this is the first
demonstration of repeated inattentional blindness within the
same individual, in the same session, with awareness assessed
after each instance.2
Importantly, this repeated IB was not simply due to the
position of the UE in the trial sequence: only 16 of 100 observers
in the time-matched control experiment failed to see the repeated
UE4 (i.e., the previously displayed leftward-moving gray cross)
—which was significantly fewer than in the experimental group
(χ2(1) = 4.85, p = 0.03;ϕ = 0.16). That the repeated IB was due
to novel properties of UE4 can also be seen by looking at what
happened on UE2 and UE3 in the primary versus control
experiments. Of observers who missed UE4 when it was a
black E, 36.84 % also missed either UE2 or UE3; of
observers who missed UE4 when it was a repeated gray
cross, 44.44 % also missed either UE2 or UE3. Thus the
groups were equally attentive (χ2(1) = 0.27, p = 0.6;
ϕ = 0.08), yet almost twice as many observers missed
UE4 when it had novel features compared to when it had
repeated features.
Experiment 2: Repeated IB with Immediate Perceptual
Reports
Inspired by the fact that repeated IB was possible at all, we
next attempted to assess it with instructions to immediately
report UEs, even mid-trial — with no time for perceptual
decay. After the first UE, observers pressed a key any time
throughout the rest of the experiment when they saw some-
thing different or unexpected. As in Experiment 1, each ob-
server saw the same UE repeated multiple times (as UE1, UE2
and UE3), followed by a novel UE4. Of interest was whether
they would indicate seeing the novel UE4 as it was happening,
at a greater rate than a repeatedUE4. In addition, to ensure that
any such difference was not due to brute visual differences
between the UE types, we counterbalanced which stimuli
were used for the repeated versus novel UEs across observers
— also now making the UEs more salient by presenting them
in novel colors (different from every other object in the
display; see Fig. 1).
Method
This experiment was identical to Experiment 1 except as re-
ported here. To increase the salience of the UEs— and to make
them equally distinct from the task-relevant items and from
each other— the cross and the E shapes were now colored (see
Fig. 1), dark red (RGB 90/0/0) or dark blue (RGB 0/0/90), with
color counterbalanced across the groups described below. The
number and speed of the moving shapes was increased, to six
black and six white L and T shapes, with velocities ranging
from 170 to 255 px/s; this increased the difficulty of the primary
task, and compensated for the increased salience of the UEs. A
new group of observers was run until we had obtained 100
observers (‘nonnoticers’) who missed UE1, using the same
exclusion criteria, but now also excluding colorblind observers,
as assessed by an incorrect response to an Ishihara plate pre-
sented during the follow-up questions (see Table 1). Half of the
observers saw the leftward-moving cross as UE1-UE3, and the
rightward-moving E as UE4 (as in Experiment 1); the other half
saw the rightward-moving E as UE1-UE3, and the leftward-
moving cross as UE4. In the corresponding control group, 50
observers saw just the cross and 50 observers saw just the E.
After the trial with UE1 had ended, observers were told
that: “any time through the rest of the experiment that you see
something different or unexpected …, immediately press the
space bar and we’ll ask you to identify it.’’ After that point, a
2 We thank Steve Most for indirectly inspiring this manipulation. Once,
while testing observers in a prior IB study, Most and the second author of
the current report were both testing observers in the same room, two at a
time. Normally, as an experimenter in IB studies, one may stand behind
the subject, gobsmacked that the observers fail to see the UE (here a red
cross)— which is so obvious to you. But once, the second author left to
use the bathroom mid-session, and on the subsequent two subjects after
he returned, he also failed to see the red cross, despite actively looking for
it! He then stopped the testing, explaining toMost that there must be some
bug in the code that was keeping the UE from appearing— at which point
Most gently explained to him that during his absence the red cross
subjects had been finished, and that Most had set both computers to start
running green-triangle UE trials. Armed with this mistaken expectation,
though, the second author had seen nothing— thus experiencing IB for
the first time himself.
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given trial always ended immediately upon any keypress, after
which observers were asked the same series of questions from
Experiment 1 in order to identify what had led them to press
the key. If no key was pressed during a trial, observers were
still asked the usual series of questions at the end, as in
Experiment 1.
Results
Error rates for the overt midline-crossings task were very
similar to those of Experiment 1, and were not significantly
different for observers who noticed (25.03 %) or failed to
notice (27.29 %) the UE1 (t(329) = 0.70, p = 0.49, d = 0.08).
As shown in Table 1, approximately one-third of observers
failed to notice UE1 (100/333 =30.03%), again replicating the
phenomenon of IB. (This is a lower proportion than in Exper-
iment 1 [χ2(1) = 22.54, p<0.001; ϕ = 0.21], presumably due
to the increased salience of the now-colored UEs.) Critically,
of these 100 nonnoticers, 13 subsequently missed the final
unexpected event when it had unexpected features (i.e., the
rightward-moving red E after previously encountering only
leftward-moving blue crosses, or vice versa, with colors
counterbalanced). And since the shapes and motions used
for the two types of UEs were counterbalanced, this difference
could not be due to the second UE just being less noticeable in
general. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of
repeated inattentional blindness — or of any IB at all! —
when observers had the explicit task to immediately respond
to anything unexpected.
Again, this repeated IB was not simply due to the position
of the UE in the trial sequence: only four of 100 observers in
the time-matched control experiment failed to see the repeated
UE4— which was significantly fewer than in the experimen-
tal group (χ2(1) = 5.21, p = 0.02; ϕ = 0.16). Thus, even when
given explicit instructions to monitor for and respond imme-
diately to unexpected events, more than three times as many
people miss a UE that does not match their expectations. And
since the shapes and motions used for the two types of UEs
were counterbalanced, this difference could not be due to
simple visual differences (e.g., if the UE4 used in the novel
condition was just less noticeable in general than the UE4
used for the repeated condition— which was a possibility in
Experiment 1).
Of course, given the instruction to report only further
‘unexpected’ events, many observers (27 % in the experimen-
tal group, 23 % in the control group) did not press the key
when further repeated events appeared after UE1 (after which
point they were no longer ‘unexpected’ by their definitions)
— even while they might still later notice the novel UE4. To
ensure that this dynamic did not distort the results, we also
measured IB in only the subset of observers who did hit the
immediate-report/noticing key in response to at least one
familiar event after UE1 but before the critical UE4 (i.e., in
response to UE2 or UE3). This analysis qualitatively
replicated the primary pattern of results: 12.33 % of these
observers failed to notice the novel UE4, while only 1.30 %
(i.e., nearly ten times fewer) failed to notice the repeated UE4
(χ2(1) = 7.33, p = 0.01; ϕ = 0.22).
Discussion
As with Experiment 1, the key aspect of these results is not the
brute magnitude of repeated IB (though a figure of 12–13 %
would certainly still be tremendously ecologically relevant in
the context of, say, traffic), but rather the (immediate report)
conditions under which it occurred. And this final test— of IB
rates for observers who used the immediate-response option
— represents the strongest test of our hypothesis: repeated
inattentional blindness was still experienced even by many
observers who (a) were explicitly instructed to attend to un-
expected events, (b) were able to immediately report (even
mid-trial) anything unexpected, and (c) actively made use of
this ability on previous trials.
General Discussion
The two experiments reported here have a straightforward
methodological implication, and a straightforward theoretical
implication.
Methodologically, these results demonstrate that it is
possible to obtain inattentional blindness repeatedly in
the same observers, in the same session, even while
assessing awareness after each critical event. The key to
this demonstration was that IB can arise not only from a
lack of any expectation, but also from a wrong expectation
(about what will occur) — where this difference increases
the magnitude of IB at least threefold in some contexts (in
Experiment 1), and possibly almost tenfold in others (in
Experiment 2). This is the first time to our knowledge that
repeated IB has been reported, where the second ‘missed’
event is of the same general character as the initially
‘missed’ event (here differing in shape, motion direction,
and color). Previously, Simons (2010) demonstrated that
even observers who noticed a not-entirely-unexpected
gorilla could still subsequently miss other unexpected
features — but these were very different display details,
better characterized as change-blindness, e.g., a change
in background curtain color. Failures to detect changes
can also be striking, but not nearly as striking as the
complete failure to see a novel UE at all: e.g., hitting a
pedestrian while driving might be caused by a failure to
see her at all, but not by a failure to notice that her shirt-
color changed.
726 Psychon Bull Rev (2015) 22:722–727
Theoretically, these results address a foundational issue that
other theorists have worried was experimentally intractable.3
Because previous demonstrations of IB always assessed no-
ticing after the UE had disappeared, they could always be re-
interpreted as (mere) failures to encode visual information into
memory, despite a possibly rich ‘in the-moment’ phenomeno-
logical experience (e.g., Block, 2011; Wolfe, 1999). (Similar-
ly, any demonstration of change blindness can be explained by
memory/comparison failures rather than a lack of visual ex-
perience; e.g., Mitroff et al., 2004). But the current results
show that IB persists even when observers report the UE
during online perception—with no time for perceptual decay
whatsoever (indeed, responding while the UE is fully visible).
We thus conclude that IB is aptly named: it reflects a genuine
deficit in moment-by-moment conscious perception, rather
than inattentional amnesia or inaccessibility.
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